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The aim of this paper is to study the possible change in the individual behaviour of the Spanish taxpayers
about thewillingness to declare capital gains, Lock-in effect, as a consequence of variations in themarginal
rate. To do this, a two stagesmodel is proposed to analyzewhich variables affect both the probability, and
the amount, of capital gains declarations. The empirical analysis was performed using the Spanish annual
personal income tax return sample from IEF-AEAT (Institute of Fiscal Studies and the Tax Department)EL classiﬁcation:
31, H23, H24
eywords:
axation
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ock-in
for the periods 2006 and 2007, corresponding to the years before and after the reform that introduced
a Dual Income Tax in Spain, with a ﬂat tax rate for capital gains tax. The main results show that a 1%
increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the probability of declaring capital gains by around 7.51%
(2006) and 8.19% (2007), and the amount of capital gains by around 3.91% (2006) and 5.79% (2007).
© 2015 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CCual Income Tax
ntroduction
The well-known Lock-in effect on the realization of capital gains
Lock-in) is caused by the rate taxation on these incomes.1 Specif-
cally, there is an inverse relationship between the marginal rate
nd the realization of capital gains, as shown in theory, taxpayers
ad a lower desire to realize such gains when the marginal rate
ayable on these gains was higher. Therefore, investors can tem-
orarily paralyze the realization of capital gains in order to lower
heir tax bill, which can lead to welfare loss in three ways. Firstly,
nvestors would not be able to carry out an adequate diversiﬁca-
ion of their investment portfolios as a result of the tax treatment
iven to each investment (Auerbach, 1988). Secondly, there is a
ecrease in potential in terms of State tax collection, as these
ains are not realized and therefore do not give rise to taxation
Feldstein, Slemrod, & Yitzhaki, 1980). Thirdly, high marginal rates
an cause a possible lock-in effect on the realization of future
nvestments (Daunfeldt, Ulrika, &Niklas, 2010; Jacob, 2013;Meade,
990).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: carlosdc@unex.es (C. Díaz Caro).
1 Proof of this is the extensive literature on the subject: Ayers et al. (2007);
onstantinides (1983); Dai, Edward, Douglas, & Harold (2008); Daunfeldt et al.
2010); Hendershott et al. (1991); Holt and Shelton (1962); Jacob (2013); Klein
1999); Reese (1998); Seltzer (1951).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.redee.2015.11.001
444-8451/© 2015 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open acce
y-nc-nd/4.0/).BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
In the last century, modern societies have shown a greater
interest in ﬁnancial markets, thereby increasing the percentage of
individual shareholders and therefore promoting potential capi-
tal gains. This phenomenon has made the capital gains tax take on
special relevance for investment, aswell as for ﬁnancial investment
and planning decisions (Jacob, 2013).
Previous studies obtained a negative correlation between the
realization of capital gains and the marginal rate applied to them,
as economic theory shows, although the results have certain dif-
ferences. On the one hand, they emphasize the analyzes conducted
with cross-sectional data, in which the transitional effect of the
behaviour of realization of capital gains is studied, whose results
show a greater than one elasticity (Daunfeldt et al., 2010; Feldstein
et al., 1980; Jacob, 2013; Minarik, 1981); while on the other hand,
in studies based on time series data the permanent effect of taxa-
tion is estimated, achieving elasticity valuesbetween−0.1 and−0.9
(Auerbach, 1988; Ayers, Craig, & John, 2007; Burman & Randolph,
1994; Gillingham & Greenlees, 1992; Jones, 1989).
Furthermore, the personal income tax of Spanish individuals
(hereinafter PIT) underwent a major reform in 2007, both in its
structure and main elements. In particular, the reform by Law
35/2006 implements adual tax rate,which represents an important
quantitative change to taxationof capital gains. Thesehavechanged
to a progressive tax rate if capital gains are generated in a period
shorter thanoneyear, and aproportional rate of 15%, for those gains
generated in aperiodof time longer thanoneyear; to aproportional
rate of 18% regardless of the time taken tobegenerated. This change
ss article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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n taxation of such income causes a change in its effective rate,
nd therefore, it is expected to produce effects on the behaviour
f taxpayers regarding their realization and amount. Therefore,
e consider it appropriate to examine how taxpayers behave to
hanges in the marginal rate of capital gains caused by changing
romaprogressive rate and/or ﬁxed rate to a ﬁxed rate regardless of
he time when those gains were generated, as a result of the appli-
ation of the dual reform, both in its realization and quantiﬁcation.
In addition, an important aspect of this study is the inclusion of
icro-data of PIT for the years 2006and2007, prepared jointlywith
he State Agency for Tax Administration (AEAT) and the Institute of
iscal Studies (IEF),whichhas the information in the tax return form
ade by the taxpayer; unlike most research done on the taxation
f capital gains, which uses data at business or stock market level
o study the possible lock-in effect of capital gains. The advantage
f this database is that it allows us to obtain information on the
apital gains declared by the taxpayer, as well as the marginal rate
hich would correspond to each ﬁscal year, in addition to relevant
ocio-economic information at individual level. Furthermore, the
mpirical estimation is performedusing a two-stagemodel in order
o avoid sample selection errors. To do so, in the ﬁrst stage, the
robability of obtaining capital gains depending on the marginal
ate applied by each taxpayer is calculated and subsequently the
actors that inﬂuence the amount of capital gains are analyzed,with
pecial relevance on the marginal rate.
After this introduction, themain differences are described in the
econd section, in terms of taxation, which the implementation of
he reform of 2007 on taxation of capital gains involves. Below, the
odel used in the empirical analysis is described. The ﬁscal micro-
ata are presented in the fourth section. The results are given in the
fth section, and ﬁnally, the work ends with the conclusions in the
ixth section.
axation of capital gains in 2006 and 2007
As mentioned in the introduction, the taxation of capital gains
uffered a wide change in setting the tax rate applying to this type
f income. Therefore, under current legislation for ﬁscal year 2006,
aw46/2002, it canbeobtained that capital gains in aperiod shorter
han one year (short-term capital gains), were taxed in the general
ax base, togetherwith other income (income fromwork, economic
ctivities and returnson capital assets), by applying the appropriate
rogressive rate.2 By contrast, those gainswhichwere generated in
period longer than one year (long-term capital gains) were taxed
n the special tax base at a proportional rate of 15%.3 Therefore, this
ituation generated clear incentives to maintain capital gains for
onger than a period of one year, thus beneﬁting from the propor-
ional tax rate, since the corresponding progressive rate would in
ny case always be superior.In addition, capital losses of a given year could be compensated
ith the gains of the same ﬁscal year and even with capital losses
orresponding to the four previous years.4
2 The progressive rate corresponding to ﬁscal year 2006 is made up of ﬁve brac-
ets, with a marginal rate which goes from 15% to 45% (15–24–28–37–45%).
3 Capital gains generated in a period shorter than one year could offset each other
n 2006. They can also compensatewith the rest of income thatmake up the General
ax Base with a limit of 10% of the positive balance of other income. Therefore, short
nd long term gains and losses could not be compensated with each other in 2006.
n 2007, capital gains and losses not arising from the transfer of assets can offset up
o a limit of 25% of the sum of returns of the General Tax Base. In 2007, capital gains
nd losses could be offset regardless of the time in which they were generated.
4 Capital gains generated by the transfer of the main residence, on the condi-
ion that the amount obtained would be invested in another main residence, were
xempt both in 2006 and 2007.agement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 15–21
However, the entry into force of Law 35/2006 implied the intro-
duction of major changes in the structure of the Spanish PIT. More
speciﬁcally, it is moving towards the structure of dual models,
establishing two distinct bases. On the one hand, the general base
which includes most of the income taxed by PIT, subject to a pro-
gressive rate,5 and on the other hand, the savings base that taxes
both the income generated by investment capital and equity gains6
at a proportional marginal rate of 18% regardless of the period in
which these two returns were generated, so there is no differenti-
ation between short and long term equity gains. This type of dual
model differs from the pure dual structure deﬁned by Sørensen
(1994, 1998), which does not speciﬁcally tax all capital income
(assets, non-ﬁnancial investment capital and equity gains from
non-transfer assets) at a proportional rate, as well as not aligning
the proportional marginal tax rates and the minimum of the pro-
gressive rateandregarding income fromeconomicactivities, it does
not differentiate the part of the income from the working source
and the income from capital. However, with this reform, the pre-
vious incentive to maintain capital gains over a period exceeding
one year disappears and is also detrimental to capital gains realized
over a period of time longer than one year, taxing them 3 percent-
age points higher (15–18%). Reduction or amortization coefﬁcients
applicable to the resulting capitals are also removed, which is a
relevant issue, as depending on the year in which the asset was
acquired, it could get a reduction of up to 100% of the resulting gain.
Therefore, from the entry into force of the new law, capital
gains obtained once this regulation was implemented, cannot ben-
eﬁt from these reduction coefﬁcients. However, these reduction or
amortization coefﬁcients can be applied to the portion of the capi-
tal gains that were generated from the purchase date until January
19, 2006,7 not being applicable to the rest of the period.
Finally, an important issue which led to this reform was the
announcement with time in advance to reorganize and plan the
taxpayer’s assets and equity elements prior to the reform and
increase in tax rates in many cases. Speciﬁcally, the Law was pub-
lished onNovember 29, 2006,with prior announcement. Therefore,
this effect produces a possible reorganization and transformation
among different sources of income as stated by some authors
(López-Laborda, Vallés, & Zárate, 2014).
Empirical model
Each ﬁscal year, taxpayers can choose to realize or not capital
gains, and therefore are taxed or not for realizing them. This choice
is an issue of censorship in the empirical estimation, so the prob-
ability of realizing gains has to be estimated for any taxpayer in
the ﬁrst stage and then the factors and to what extent they affect
the amount of gains realized have to be determined, if performing
the realization effectively occurs. The so-called two-stage models
can incorporate these two sequences. The implementation of the
two stagemodel proposed byHeckman (1979) enables to solve two
problems in the estimation. On the one hand, data censorship and
on the other hand the data sample selection caused by restricting
the sample in the second stage only to those taxpayers who declare
a capital gain. The proposedmodel byHeckman consists of estimat-
ing a “probit” model in the ﬁrst step, to obtain the probability of
5 The progressive rate for 2007 is composed of four brackets, 24–28–37–43%,
althoughoneof themost signiﬁcant aspects of the reform is the change introduced in
the personalminimumand familyminimum,which changes frombeing a reduction
in the tax base to a deduction in the gross tax payable.
6 There are some equity gains which are included in the general base, which
among others are prizes obtained from games or rafﬂes; subsidies or aid granted
to the main residence or public subsidies for owners of Spanish Historic Heritage.
7 Fulﬁlling certain requirements under the ninth transitional provision of Law
35/2006 of PIT.
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ealization of capital gains, and from the results of this estimation,
n the second stage capital gains effectively realized are regressed
epending on some determinants.
Following the proposal of Jacob (2013) the estimation of the
robit model would be as follows in Eq. (1):
harei = ˇ0 + ˇ1X ′i + εi (1)
here Sharei represents the probability of realizing capital gains
t some point in time for each taxpayer “i” and X ′
i
is a vector of
ndependent variables which affect this probability.
From the results obtained in the previous step, a regression
odel is estimated usingOrdinary Least Squares8 in order to obtain
he elasticities on the realization of capital gains, introducing the
nverse of Mills ratio to isolate the sample selection problem of the
revious regression.
ainsi = ˛ + ˛1′Z ′i + ˛2InvMillsi + εi (2)
f Sharei =1where the dependent variable Gainsi represents the
onetary value of the capital gains realized for any taxpayer “i”;
′
i
includes a set of variables that affect the amount of realization of
apital gains. Finally, InvMills includes information of the 1st stage,
voiding bias in the selection.
atabases
To carry out the empirical study we used Annual Samples of
IT for the years 2006 and 2007, the years before and after the
eform in Spain. The processing of the annual samples is the result
f the collaboration between the Tax Agency and the Spanish Insti-
ute for Fiscal Studies. The unit of analysis is personal income tax
eturns, with a geographical area covering the entire territory of
he Spanish common system of taxation. In total, the database con-
ains 964,489 (1,351,8029) with 352 observations (358) variables,
or 2006 (2007), representing a total of 17,840,783 (18,702,875) tax
eturns,where in each case the contents of the variables are the val-
es corresponding to the boxes of the tax returns submitted each
ear shown on model 100.
The variables10 that were incorporated into the analysis are
etailed below. In the ﬁrst place, a dummy variable Share was
eﬁned as an approximation of those taxpayers with private par-
icipation in some assets and consequently, with some probability
f realizing capital gains at some point in time. Following the pro-
osal by Jacob (2013), this variable takes value 1 if the following
onditions are met: that the taxpayer‘s tax return shows income
rom capital11; if the taxpayer obtains returns on capital assets,12hus including the possibility of selling property assets; and ﬁnally,
f the taxpayer makes capital gains in the short or long term. In all
ther cases this variable is zero.
8 Other speciﬁcationswere estimated, in particular aMultinomial Logit to analyze
he realizationof net capital gains compared tonot realizing themor toobtainingnet
apital losses; butdue to the characteristics of thedatabaseused, its estimation isnot
ossible, since the number of taxpayers with capital losses is insufﬁcient compared
o those who obtain net capital gains.
9 The sample size is calculated for both years considering an error in the means
f the Income variable of less than 1.1%, with a conﬁdence level of 3 per thousand.
or more information see Picos, Pérez, and González (2009, 2011).
10 Table I from the Annex shows the correlations for 2006 and 2007.
11 In 2007, there is an exemption for the ﬁrst 1500 euros in dividends, in order
o compensate for double taxation of dividends, which are not listed on the return
orm. The investment income includes a series of income such as: interests, divi-
ends, other assets and insurance contracts. Following Jacob (2013), interests are
ncluded, so as not to exclude potential holders of ﬁnancial assets that could gener-
te a possible capital gain, because those taxpayers with income from capital have
ome probability to own shares, as households tend to distribute their assets among
isk-free ones.
12 It refers to returns from rents, as well as allocations of incomes and losses
peciﬁed in the PIT.agement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 15–21 17
The construction of the marginal rate variable (Tmg) shows cer-
tain methodological problems, as capital gains are taxed in two
differentiated bases in both ﬁscal years. Therefore, we proceeded
to calculate a marginal rate weighted depending on the percentage
of capital gains that are taxed at one rate or another. In short, we
adapted the proposal shown in Onrubia and Sanz (2009) with the
following modiﬁcations:
TmgPONDi =
GANGEN
GAN
TmgGENi +
GANESP/AHO
GAN
TmgESP/AHO
i
(3)
where GANi represents the total capital gains declared by a tax-
payer for a particular year, while GANGEN and GANESP/AHO are capital
gains taxed in the general base and special savings base for 2006
and 2007, respectively. Finally TmgGEN and TmgESP/AHO include the
marginal rates of the general base, the special and savings base.
Additionally, a set of control variables was used. In particular,
the following:
- High income: dummy variable that takes the value one if the tax-
payer exceeds 100,000 euros of income and zero value in other
cases.
- Low income: dummy variable that takes the value one if the tax-
payer does not reach 10,000 euros of income, being value zero
otherwise.
- Wage Activity: dummy variable that takes the value one if the
taxpayer receives income from economic activities higher than
those generated by income from personal work and will take the
value zero in any other circumstances.
- Children: dummy variable that is equal to the unit if the taxpayer
has at least one child, while it will be zero in the absence of
children.
- Joint: it is a dummy variable that contains information about the
type of income tax return, so that it takes the value one for joint
taxation and zero for individual taxation.
- Rent: dummy variable whose value is equal to one if the tax-
payer actually receives income from real estate and will be zero
otherwise.
- Sex:variabledummywithavalueofone in thecaseof the taxpayer
being male and it will take the value of zero if it is a female.
- Age: it is a discrete variable which gives the age of the taxpayer.
- Decile: it is a discreet variable which takes values between 1 and
10 and represents the decile to which the taxpayer belongs to
depending on his/her taxable income.
- Activity: dummyvariable,which take thevalueone if the taxpayer
obtains income from economic activities and zero otherwise.
- Capital: dummy variable, which is built as proxy of the taxpayer’s
wealth, so that itwill take the value one if the taxpayer has capital
income higher than 100,000 euros or zero otherwise.
- Net capital gains: continuous variable, which shows the value of
taxpayers capital gains13.
Tables A.1 and A.2 below show the main statistical descriptions
and correlations between variables.
The proposed model for empirical estimation is as follows:
Sharei = ˇ0 + ˇ1Tmgi + ˇ2Decilei + ˇ3High Incomei
+ˇ4Act wagei + ˇ5Sexi + ˇ6Agei + ˇ7Childreni
+ˇ8Activityi + ˇ9Capitali + ˇ10Low Incomei
+ˇ11Jointi + εi (4)
13 This variable shows a series of limitations due to the database limitations of
the database used. In particular, it was necessary to include net equity gains, that
is, once the losses were compensated. This limitation is due to no having separate
information regarding equity gains and losses for 2007.However, due to the fact that
you are taxed for this concept, it was thought convenient to opt for this deﬁnition.
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ainsi = ˛0 + ˛1Tmgi + ˛2High Incomei + ˛3Low Incomei
+˛4Act wagei + ˛5Agei + ˛6Childreni + ˛7Sexi
+˛8Renti + ˛9Gross Incomei + ˛10Jointi
+˛11InvMillsi + εi (5)
f Sharei =1
The weighted marginal rate is included to analyze the impact
f the realization of capital gains in qualitative and quantitative
erms. Beforehand, it is expected that the coefﬁcient relative to this
ariable is negative, i.e., that it negatively inﬂuences the decision of
ealization of capital gains at a givenmoment (Burman&Randolph,
994). However, the realization of capital gains in turn depends
n income (Auerbach, Burman, & Siegel, 2000; Poterba, 1987) and
nancial experience (Calvert, Campbell, & Sodini, 2009a, 2009b;
har & Ning, 2006), since those investors with a high degree of
nancial knowledge and with a high income tend to have a lower
esponse to novices in ﬁnance (Jacob, 2013). On the other hand,
nancial knowledge may be related to individuals who do not have
ncome from economic activities and with a low gross income. The
bsence of proxy indicators that allow us to calculate the ﬁnancial
xpertise of the taxpayer, i.e., the individual‘s educational level,
egree of work occupation or knowledge about investments, has
ed us to the use of Gross Income and the variable Capital as an
pproximation thereof, since some correlation between the two
ariables is observed in the ﬁnancial literature (Dhar &Ning, 2006).
High income and low income are analyzed as control variables to
etermine the inﬂuence of the taxpayer‘s income level. In addition,
age Activity is included in order to understand the signiﬁcance of
he difference in obtaining the source of income by the taxpayer.
Furthermore, the variables Joint and Children are included to
nalyze the effect that the family and household size have (Calvert
t al., 2009a, 2009b); while Age represents the life cycle hypothe-
is, according to which adult individuals should be more likely to
ealize capital gains and of a greater amount than young people
Daunfeldt et al., 2010). Finally, the Sex variable is introduced as
n explanatory factor of possible differences in behaviour of the
ealization of capital gains between men and women.
Eq. (4) contains control variables that affect the probability of
eing a potential taxpayer with capital gains (Campbell, 2006;
acob, 2013; Van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011). Speciﬁcally, the
ecile variable is included to control the probability that effectively
capital gainwill be realized in terms of income andwealth, so that
hose individuals who are in a high decile of income distribution
how a higher probability to maintain their assets than those who
re in lower deciles of income distribution (Campbell, 2006).More-
ver, economic activities (Activity) has been taken into account as
proxy of having businesses and/or companies.
On the other hand, the variable Renti reﬂects the fact that the
axpayer “i” obtains returns on capital assets, and therefore before-
and, we expect there is a greater chance to keep the assets in the
ortfolio and not realize capital gains or realize them at a lower
mount. The literature shows how most investment portfolios of
ouseholdsaremadeupof capital assets andbankassets (Campbell,
006). Although it is worth noting that in the particular case of
he conﬁguration of Spanish household portfolios, the participa-
ion of capital assets as the main investment source stands out
igniﬁcantly (Domínguez-Barrero & López-Laborda, 2012).
esultsThis section presents the main results. The following Table A.3
hows the estimated probability of realization of capital gains for
oth 2006 and 2007 periods, following the proposal of Eq. (3). Each
olumn represents the estimated coefﬁcients based on the probitagement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 15–21
model for each ﬁscal year, thus reﬂecting the determinants on the
decision to realize any capital gain by the taxpayer. Among the
main factors that have a positive inﬂuence on the decision for both
years are: the Decile variable, obtaining income (high income and
low income), Age, number of Children, the importance of the busi-
ness activity (Activity) and thepercentageof income fromeconomic
activities in relation to wage income (Wage Activity). By contrast,
among the variables that inﬂuence negatively are Sex, obtaining
gains from Capital and submitting a Joint income tax return.
The elasticities obtained from the estimation of the probit
selection model are presented in Table A.4. The highest value cor-
responds to the taxpayer’s marginal rate variable in relation to
realizing capital gains or not, being slightly higher in 2007 (−8.19%)
compared to 2006 (−7.51%), therefore, taxpayers had a higher sen-
sitivity to the realization of capital gains in 2007. This phenomenon,
which goes against the initial approach of the theory, shows that
the lower the tax rate, the lower the sensitivity or elasticity, and can
be explainedby the increase in theproportionalmarginal rate these
capital gains had in 2006 (15%) to 2007 (18%); and the announce-
mentof the reformwell in advance so that taxpayers could carryout
adequate tax planning, as well as changes made in the reductive or
amortization coefﬁcients. Next, the Decile Variable is highlighted,
which shows that how belonging to a higher decile leads to a
greater realization of capital gains, although there are no major
differences between the two years. The remaining variables have
relatively low elasticities, the most important being the Age vari-
able,which showed a distinct inﬂuence between the two years, this
difference may suggest that the impact of the Life Cycle Theory on
consumption and savings has greater impact in the year 2007. That
is, the higher the age, the higher the probability of realizing capital
gains with a ﬁxed tax rate on capital gains, which is characteris-
tic of a model of dual taxation on income, compared with varying
rates.
Below, in Table A.5 the results of the OLS estimation are shown
for bothyears, 2006and2007. Since themainobjectiveof this paper
is to analyze how the tax rate affects capital gains, wewill start pre-
senting the estimated results for the marginal rate. The coefﬁcient
associated with the weighted marginal rate is negative, therefore,
it is indicating that of the individuals who have decided to real-
ize capital gains, the amount realized is lower when the taxation of
capital gains is higher, being this phenomenonmore pronounced in
2007 than in 2006. This result is consistent with previous literature
both in the USA (Auerbach & Siegel, 2000; Auten & Clotfelter, 1982;
Bogart&Gentry, 1995;Burman&Randolph, 1994) as inmore recent
studies in Europe, highlighting the case of Sweden (Daunfeldt et al.,
2010) and Germany (Jacob, 2013).
The elasticity of the weighted marginal rate is −3.91% (−5.79%)
for 2006 (2007). This implies that a 1% increase in the taxation
of capital gains reduces the amount of realization of capital gains
by 3.91% (5.79%) respectively. Clearly, we can see how there is a
difference between the two years, mainly due to taxation of cap-
ital gains in both tax systems, which causes increased sensitivity
in the amount of realization of capital gains in 2007 compared
to 2006. This result seems to indicate that the tax rate and ﬁscal
changes resulting from the reform explain to a large extent the
variations in the amount of capital gains carried out by the tax-
payer. The estimates of the marginal rate elasticity with respect
to capital gains have higher values compared to the transitional
elasticities obtained by Auten and Clotfelter (1982), Burman and
Randolph (1994),AuerbachandSiegel (2000)andAyerset al. (2007)
for USA. Similarly, the results are also higher than those reported
in the range of elasticities of time series studies (Auten & Cordes,
1991; Bogart & Gentry, 1995) and cross-sectional studies using tax
data (Daunfeldt et al., 2010). However, they lie within the intervals
provided by Jacob (2013) in which an approximation is carried out
and with data similar to that followed in this work.
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With regard to non-tax variables, we ﬁnd that income has a pos-
tive and signiﬁcant effect on the realization of larger amounts of
apital gains, that is, with increasing income the taxpayer tends
o realize a higher capital gain, being this effect higher in 2007,
esulting elasticity of capital gains with respect to taxable income
he most important factor, after the marginal rate. However, those
axpayers who have low incomes made smaller amounts of cap-
tal gains, although in 2007 the effect was the opposite. On the
ther hand, those taxpayers who obtain a very high income (more
han 100,000 euros) show a negative effect on capital gains, and
his effect was again higher in 2007. The possibility of getting
ents inﬂuences both periods negatively and getting higher income
rom business activities than work income implies a negative (pos-
tive) elasticity in 2006 (2007). In sum, the results obtained are the
xpected ones, based on the literature (Auten & Clotfelter, 1982;
urman & Randolph, 1994; Daunfeldt et al., 2010).
Household characteristics that present positive elasticities with
espect to the amount of capital gains realized are Age and Joint
or the 2006 ﬁnancial period. On the contrary, in the 2007 period
he variables Sex14, Children – are lower in relation to other studies
Jacob, 2013) – and Jointhavenegative elasticities,which are all less
han 1%. A comparative analysis of the results obtained in previous
tudies shed somedisparity between thosemade in theUSA (Auten
Clotfelter, 1982; Burman & Randolph, 1994) and European ones,
he latter being closer to the results of this work (Daunfeldt et al.,
010).15
Finally, the inverse of the Ratio of Mills has a positive and sta-
istically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient different from zero, which implies
hat the empirical model does not have sample selection problems
nd consequently, the parameter estimates do not produce a bias
or both 2006 and 2007.
onclusions
The effect of the tax rate on the realization of capital gains has
enerated great interest in the United States (see among others:
uerbach & Siegel, 2000; Auten & Clotfelter, 1982; Bogart &Gentry,
995; Burman & Randolph, 1994) and more recently in Europe,
n the case of Sweden (Daunfeldt et al., 2010) and in the case of
ermany (Jacob, 2013).
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the lock-in effecthat the tax rate could cause on the probability of realization or not
f capital gains and its amount if it occurs, declared in income tax
eturn, after the reform carried out on this tax in 2007, at which
ime a model of dual income tax was ﬁrst introduced in Spain. This
14 In the case of the Sex variable, the result differs from that obtained in another
ork which analyzes the inﬂuence of this variable (Daunfeldt et al., 2010).
15 The main difference between both studies with respect to age can be explained
y the different tax designs imposedbydifferentiated legislative treatment between
SA, Sweden and Spain.agement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 15–21 19
tax design structure taxes independently almost all capital gains at
a ﬁxed rate of 18%, unlike the previous model that taxed differenti-
ating the period of time in which they were generated, more than
one year at a ﬁxed rate of 15%, less than one year at a progressive
rate (15–45%). The database used in the work corresponds to the
annual samples of taxpayers’ PIT, which collects taxpayers’ tax for
the pre and post reform years 2006 and 2007. The existence and
the possible use of tax data enables to obtain very reliable results,
collecting the set of total respondents and the possibility to analyze
how this tax will affect their behaviour both on the realization or
not of capital gains and the amount.
The results of the work suggest that a high taxation level of
capital gains is associated with a lower amount in the realization
of capital gains, once individuals have decided to realize them, as
stated by the theory. Speciﬁcally, the elasticities obtained after the
reform show how the effect of taxation on capital gains increased
compared with the previous year, in which the marginal rate inﬂu-
enced more prominently in the amount of realized capital gains.
In addition to the changes that have taken place on marginal rates,
changes in reductive and amortization coefﬁcients are considered
relevant changes as a possible explanation for the results. The
results also conﬁrm previous studies in both the United States and
Europe and suggest that high taxes on capital gains generated a
greater Lock-in effect on capital gains, both in their realization and
amount.
As for non-tax variables, the positive inﬂuence of taxable income
and age is highlighted, as well as obtaining rents and income from
economic activities. On the contrary, being female and the number of
children has a negative inﬂuence. These results are those expected
with respect to the theory. However, they have certain differences
with those obtained in USA, although they are closer to studies at
European level.
Finally, we mention the limitations of this study, mainly related
to the database used because in the ﬁrst place, it provides informa-
tion about the gains and losses on a net basis, this is once capital
gains and losses are compensated with each other. Secondly, there
is no information about the wealth or asset portfolio composition
of the taxpayer. Thirdly, it is not possible to differentiate long-
term gains from short-term gains for ﬁscal year 2007. Finally, when
workingwithﬁscaldata, it is alsonotpossible to control taxevasion,
which could condition the results obtained.Appendix A.
Tables A.1–A.6
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Table A.1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable 2006 2007
Media Standard
deviation
Min Max Media Standard
deviation
Min Max
Share 0.8853048 0.318654 0 1 0.2175009 0.4125462 0 1
Tmg 0.2333914 0.1283445 0.15 0.45 0.1861856 0.0247287 0.18 0.43
Low Income 0.2128799 0.4093436 0 1 0.1987767 0.3990797 0 1
High Income 0.0143083 0.1187586 0 1 0.0137817 0.1165837 0 1
Act wage 0.0997206 0.2996273 0 1 0.1060096 0.3078501 0 1
Children 0.3836231 0.4862681 0 1 0.3787379 0.4850729 0 1
Joint 0.2692982 0.4435954 0 1 0.2520162 0.4341707 0 1
Rent 0.2630238 0.4402755 0 1 0.0801759 0.2715654 0 1
Sex 0.6058895 0.488659 0 1 0.5957742 0.4907418 0 1
Age 46.3514 16.22243 0 99 46.47461 16.24064 0 99
Gross Income 23,870.61 93,290.49 0 5,810,000,000 24,126.89 13,100,000 0 158,000,000
Decile 5.499944 2.87225 1 10 5.49983 2.872281 1 10
Act dummy 0.1744088 0.3794609 0 1 0.1680544 0.3739147 0 1
Capital 0.0149769 0.1214604 0 1 0.2913846 0.454404 0 1
Gainsa 2394.73 84,456.86 0 55,300,000 1724.655 124,000 0 158,000,000
Source: Own compilation from data of Spanish Personal Income Tax Return 2006 and 2007.
a The values for those taxpayers who earn greater than 0 winnings are: an average of 13,877.43 euros, with a total of 3,078,629 taxpayers for 2006 and 10,639.35 euros,
with a total of 3,038,126 taxpayers for 2007
Table A.2
Correlations of variables 2006 and 2007.
Share Tmg Low
Income
High
Income
Act Wage Children Joint Rent Sex Age Gross
Income
Decile Act dum Capital Gains
Share 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tmg 0.00 −0.03 −0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.06 0.04 −0.18 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.09 −0.01
Low Income 0.00 0.00 −0.09 0.04 −0.11 −0.07 −0.08 −0.15 0.06 −0.04 −0.68 0.02 −0.07 −0.01
High Income 0.00 −0.09 −0.09 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.26 0.06 0.08 0.09
Act wage 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 −0.06 0.01 −0.05 0.07 −0.07 0.00
Children 0.00 0.04 −0.12 0.03 0.08 0.13 −0.04 0.02 −0.33 0.01 0.14 0.07 −0.01 0.00
Joint 0.00 −0.02 −0.07 −0.01 0.07 0.15 −0.06 0.29 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.00
Rent 0.00 −0.15 −0.08 0.12 0.05 −0.03 0.06 −0.05 0.19 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.01
Sex 0.00 0.02 −0.15 −0.01 0.06 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.12 −0.04 0.00
Age 0.00 −0.25 0.07 0.05 −0.05 −0.32 0.14 0.32 0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.04 0.01
Gross Income 0.00 −0.04 −0.06 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.52 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.98
Decile 0.00 −0.09 −0.69 0.27 −0.02 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.18 −0.01 0.14 −0.01 0.13 0.03
Act dum 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.06 0.63 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.01 −0.09 0.00
Capital 0.00 −0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 0.06 0.01
Gains 0.00 −0.04 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.07 0.02 0.00
Source: Own compilation from data of Spanish Personal Income Tax Return 2006 and 2007.
Note: The variables corresponding to the 2006 correlations are below the diagonal and 2007 above.
Table A.3
Results probit.
2006 2007
Tmg −17.3118a 0.1129 −21.161a (0.1563)
Decile 0.4012a (0.0032) 0.3909a (0.0024)
High Income 1.7367a (0.0273) 2.2840a (0.0322)
ACT wage 0.0439a (0.0177) 0.1619a (0.0165)
Sex −0.0902a (0.0117) −0.1519a (0.0098)
Age 0.0073a (0.0003) 0.0191a (0.0003)
Children 0.0207a (0.0124) 0.0305a (0.0101)
Activity 0.0647a (0.0146) 0.1374a (0.0147)
Capital −0.1509a (0.0189) −0.6555a (0.0135)
Low Income 0.52037a (0.0163) 0.8305a (0.0105)
Joint −0.1664a (0.0110) −0.2574a (0.0095)
Constant 0.7821a (0.0344) 14.203a (0.0413)
Source: Own compilation from data of Spanish Personal Income Tax Return 2006
and 2007.
r
Table A.4
Elasticities of probit.
2006 2007
Tmg −7.5137 (0.0635) −8.1986 (0.0735)
Decile 3.6472 (0.0288) 3.2101 (0.0197)
High Income 0.0411 (0.0007) 0.0449 (0.0007)
ACT wage 0.0072 (0.0029) 0.0256 (0.0026)
Sex −0.0903 (0.0117) −0.1351 (0.0088)
Age 0.5643 (0.0249) 1.3267 (0.0201)
Children 0.0131 (0.0078) 0.0173 (0.0057)
Activity 0.0186 (0.0042) 0.0344 (0.0036)
Capital −0.0037 (0.0005) −0.0285 (0.0059)
Low Income 0.1831 (0.0056) 0.2464 (0.0031)
Joint −0.0741 (0.0048) −0.0968 (0.0035)
Source: Own compilation from data of Spanish Personal Income Tax Return 2006
and 2007.a Signiﬁcant with a conﬁdence level of 99%. The values given in parentheses are
obust standard errors.
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Table A.5
Results OLS.
2006 2007
Tmg −2.71e+07a (387,718.2) −3.30e+07a (953,884)
Low Income −276,687.4a (24,492.29) 382,532.7a (17,383.84)
High Income −6,400,961a (225,799.5) −9,217,887a (466,569.2)
ACT wage −192,270.5a (34,373.5) 10,135.85a (33,109.65)
Children −316,096.8a (20,336.18) −330,296.3a (25,508.35)
Joint 122,828.8a (18,139.7) −67,267.76a (23,392.52)
Rent −241,207.4a (19,350.4) −267,629.7a (3,307,694)
Sex −526,317a (19,598.66) −595,022.4a (20,289.17)
Age 2,306.826a (550.4034) 18,173.99a (915.89)
Gross Income 0.9295648a (0.0108063) 0.9542498a (0.02241)
Mills 2,169,212a (33,211.98) 2,565,300a (77,059.03)
Constant 1,822,187a (55,616.93) 2,277,170a (79,544.21)
R-squared 0.939 0.9577
Source: Own compilation from data of Spanish Personal Income Tax Return 2006
and 2007.
a Signiﬁcant with a conﬁdence level of 99%. The values given in parentheses are
robust standard errors.
Table A.6
Elasticities (OLS).
2006 2007
Tmg −3.919646 (0.06477) −5.796014 (0.16014)
Low Income −0.028336 (0.00257) 0.0475635 (0.00216)
High Income −0.254532 (0.00884) −0.4247158 (0.02126)
ACT Wage −0.01578 (0.00284) 0.0010699 (0.00349)
Children −0.084288 (0.00546) −0.1073914 (0.00857)
Joint 0.023209 (0.00347) −0.0146713 (0.00505)
Rent −0.075663 (0.00605) −0.0391116 (0.00478)
Sex −0.233275 (0.00871) −0.3228303 (0.01169)
Age 0.088087 (0.02103) 0.8859635 (0.0427)
Gross Income 2.867809 (0.03156) 3.55983 (0.07864)
S
a
R
A
A
A
A
A
A
BMills 1.27105 (0.02197) 1.064873 (0.03066)
ource: Own compilation from data of Spanish Personal Income Tax Return 2006
nd 2007.
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